Jennifer teaches critical thinking, legal writing and research, business law and justice studies courses. She has a law degree.
Friday has finally arrived and you are looking forward to a quiet weekend. You crave the sanctity of home and a respite from the hectic interactions, conflicts and accusations of the world outside. After a brief stop at the corner pizza shop, you head home, happy with the prospect of a few peaceful hours ahead.
But wait. As you turn a corner you see a car in your driveway and an open front door. An officer exits with a pile of your personal letters. You hadn't provided consent for anyone to enter your premises. Your home is your castle, your turf, your safe haven. You protest and bid adieu to the prospect of a relaxing evening.
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Our understanding of our homes as our castles means that, when home, we are free from the prospect of unjustified intrusion. Whether or not we are home, others cannot enter our premises without a legal right or warrant to do so. Arguably officials also shouldn't be able to use evidence gathered illegally from our homes against us. But can they?
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The 4th Amendment protects individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures. Our Constitution also protects us against warrantless searches of our homes and our possessions.
For many years, though, our courts did not account for how evidence was obtained, when deciding whether the evidence would be admitted in a court of law. Rather, evidence was typically permitted and, if it had been obtained illegally, separate action was taken to prosecute those offenders.
This practice made the 4th Amendment of little (if any) value to many criminal defendants. After all, for a scared defendant charged with a crime and the prospect of fines, imprisonment, and loss of freedom, knowing that the individual who entered his home illegally and took his possessions without consent would be reprimanded offered inadequate comfort and compensation.
In the landmark case of Weeks v. United States (232 U.S. 383) the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this viable concern in connection with Federal court criminal cases.
On December 21, 1911, police officers approached the home of Fremont Weeks, located a key, and entered the premises. The officers entered the premises without Week's consent or the presence of a search warrant. Weeks was at work and remained unaware of these events.
After entering, the police searched the premises and took possession of papers and other personal items. The police, along with a U.S. marshal, returned later that same day, obtained admittance from a boarder and again, without a search warrant or consent, confiscated additional letters and envelopes. A search warrant was not obtained in connection with either visit.
Weeks was later arrested, without a warrant, at his place of employment and charged, in part, with using the mail system to send lottery tickets (which was in violation of the Criminal Code).
Weeks, without awaiting trial, filed a petition for the return of his papers and other property, arguing that the property was unlawfully obtained and held in violation of Week's rights under the U.S. Constitution. Week's motion was denied in part. The lower court initially ordered the return of some, but not all, of the property. All property (although illegally seized) that was pertinent to outstanding criminal charges against Weeks was retained and put in evidence, over Week's objection, during Week's trial.
Weeks was ultimately convicted of a criminal charge that he used the mail system illegally and for the purposes of transporting lottery tickets. The evidence illegally seized from his home was a crucial factor leading to the conviction. Appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court, Weeks argued that the seizing of his private letters violated his 4th and 5th Amendment rights. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the 4th Amendment.
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In Weeks v. U.S. the Supreme Court addressed two questions:
Did the warrantless search of (and seizure of items in) Week's home violate his 4th Amendment rights?
Is evidence obtained as a result of a warrantless search and seizure admissible in a Federal criminal court prosecution?
The Supreme Court unanimously held, in an opinion authored by Supreme Court Justice William R. Day, that a warrantless search and seizure of personal property from a private residence constitutes a violation of an individual's 4th Amendment rights. The Supreme Court also ruled that evidence obtained in this manner would not be permitted for use in a Federal criminal prosecution.
Justice Day, writing the Court's opinion, reasoned that if private possessions can be illegally seized and used as evidence against a defendant, the 4th Amendment 'might as well be stricken from the Constitution'. (232 U.S. 383). Justice Day also reasoned that to hold this evidence and permit its use in trial represents the commission of 'prejudicial error'. (232 U.S. 383).
The Court reversed and remanded the lower court's decision.
The Supreme Court's ruling established what has become known as the exclusionary rule. The exclusionary rule prevents the use of most evidence obtained from an unreasonable search or seizure in violation of the 4th Amendment. The rule is intended to prevent law enforcement personnel from conducting illegal searches and seizures and also to protect defendants whose rights have been compromised. Notably, though, the court's ruling in Weeks v. U.S. extended only to Federal court cases. A later decision (Mapp v. Ohio (1961)) would broaden this protection to states courts, as well.
Weeks v. United States (1914) clarified an individual's protection against the unlawful search and seizure of property as well as the Federal court admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of a criminal defendant's 4th Amendment rights. The Court's holding and the associated exclusionary rule reaffirm that not only are our homes our castles, but evidence retrieved from our homes illegally and without our consent, is not permitted in Federal court.
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